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.Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August
2 and the subsequent United Nations
embargo on oil exports from both coun-
tries have been accompanied by soaring
oil prices, declines in stock and bond
markets, and renewed speculations about
economic recession. Such concerns
would seem to be well founded; there is
evidence that large oil price increases
have been a harbinger of higher inflation
and recession many times in the past.
A limitless number of scenarios are pos-
sible for future oil supplies and prices, of
course. It is uncertain when Iraqi and
Kuwaiti crude oil will resume flowing to
world markets, to what extent other
sources of supply will replace that crude,
and whether these additional sources
will be interrupted because of military or
political action. Therefore, this Economic
Commentary makes no effort to forecast
the path that crude oil production and
prices will take. Instead, it examines the
theoretical impact of an oil shortage on
the U.S. economy, reviews the history of
such shocks, and considers some of the
limits and risks of monetary policy
responses to a supply shock.
• Oil and the Economy: Theory
and Evidence
The U.S. economy has experienced
several energy crises over the past 45
years. We can identify at least seven oil
price shocks of sizable magnitude
between the end of World War II and
the start of the current expansion (figure
1). It is provocative to note that all but
one of the last eight recessions were
immediately preceded by an oil price
shock, leading some economists to
conclude that oil market disturbances
have been a prominent cause of post-
World War II business cycles.
Disturbances that impair an economy's
ability to produce goods and services are
called "supply shocks," and include such
phenomena as natural disasters, labor
disputes, and political upheaval. How-
ever, because energy is vital to almost all
production processes, its scarcity impacts
the economy more broadly than supply
shocks that are more or less sector spe-
cific, such as those caused by droughts
or strikes.
Economic theory offers some insight
into the impact of an oil shock on real
output and interest rates, labor markets,
and the price level/ At a given level of
work effort, output declines because
fewer energy resources are flowing into
production. The magnitude of the
downturn depends on the importance of
oil to the production process and the ease
with which alternative energy sources
can be substituted. The drop in output
reduces wealth, and is felt by households
as a decline in the value of assets such as
equities and real money balances.
If consumers believe that the energy short-
age will be short-lived, they will hold
closely to their current spending level and
offset the temporary income loss by
borrowing, producing upward pressure
Soaring oil prices have caused
speculation about the prospects for a
national recession this winter. These
concerns seem to be well grounded;
all but one of the eight post-World
War II recessions in the United States
were preceded by an oil price shock.
However, there is also evidence that
the influence of oil prices on economic
performance has diminished. This
article examines the impact of an oil
shortage on the U.S. economy from a
theoretical perspective, reviews the
effects that such shocks have had in
the past, and discusses the problems
that these crises present for monetary
policy.
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on real interest rates. However, if con-
sumers expect a prolonged income and
wealth loss, they will reduce their
spending to correspond with their dimin-
ished budget, leaving borrowing and the
real interest rate unaffected.
Economic theory is ambiguous about the
net impact of an oil shortage on employ-
ment. Higher real interest rates and
reduced wealth encourage an increase in
work effort. However, if the oil shock
reduces the marginal productivity of
labor and real hourly earnings fall
accordingly, workers will be inclined to
work less.
Finally, an oil shortage tends to exert
upward pressure on the price level.
This occurs because the decline in real
output produces an increase in the
"money" value of all goods if the sup-
ply of money remains constant. To para-
phrase an old saying, the same amount
of money is now chasing fewer goods.
The chronicle of oil shocks and their
effects on the U.S. economy is generally
consistent with the scenario outlined
above (table 1). In each of the last three
major oil crises (the OPEC embargo of
1974, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and
the outbreak of the Iran/Iraq war in
TABLE 1 OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND THE ECONOMY



































b. Consumer Price Index.
c. Treasury bill rate less Livingston Survey inflation forecast.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and the Philadelphia Inquirer.
1980-81), upward pressure on the price
level coincided with a decline in output
relative to its trend rate of growth. Clear-
ly, these periods can be characterized as
supply shocks. Moreover, evidence sug-
gests that only the OPEC embargo was
perceived as "permanent": Despite a 65
percent increase in oil prices, the expected
real interest rate did not rise during this
crisis. The latter two instances, the Iranian
revolution and the onset of the Iran/Iraq
war, seem to have been perceived as tem-
porary shocks; while oil prices rose at
annualized rates of roughly 47 percent
and 31 percent, respectively, expected real
interest rates also increased.
5
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait sent oil prices
skyrocketing 85 percent between mid-
July and mid-September, altering the
economic outlook in a predictable way.
According to the September 10 (post-
invasion) consensus forecast compiled
by Blue Chip Economic Indicators, real
economic growth has been revised
downward 1.3 percent and inflation has
been revised upward 1 percent through
1991 :IIQ (table 2).
6 However, the
predictions for output growth and infla-
tion beyond 1991 :IIQ have been virtual-
ly unaffected by the energy price shock,
an indication that forecasters expect the
full effects of the shock to be felt fairly
quickly. The revised forecast does showFIGURE 2 ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Real output per million Btu, 1982 dollars
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency; Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
TABLE 2 IMPACT OF THE CURRENT OIL CRISIS












































































a. Based on the Blue Chip Economic Indicators consensus forecasts of July 10, 1990 (pre-invasion) and
September 10, 1990 (post-invasion).
b. Treasury bill rate less Consumer Price Index.
SOURCE: Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Sedona, Arizona.
a negative impact on expected real inter-
est rates, however. This downward ad-
justment seems to indicate that borrow-
ing demands will ease in response to the
crisis; that is, the oil price increase will
not soon be reversed.
There is reason to believe that the
capacity of the U.S. economy to ride
out a long-lived energy price shock has
improved substantially since the oil
crisis of 1974: Industrial output has
grown roughly 50 percent since 1973,
and yet petroleum usage has fallen 9
percent and total energy usage is off 6
percent in that sector. Stated simply, the
overall energy efficiency of the econ-
omy is 37 percent greater today than it
was in 1973, and in the industrial sector,
energy efficiency has improved 55 per-
cent (figure 2).
To illustrate the diminished influence of
oil on real economic activity, we esti-
mated the lagged impact of changes in
the price of crude oil on real GNP growth
for three periods: 1955-72, 1972-82,
and 1982-89 (figure 3).
8 In the 1955-72
era, a 10 percent rise in petroleum prices
was followed by a net real GNP loss of
0.7 percent per year over a span of three
years. During the 1972-82 period, an oil
price increase of similar magnitude
caused a much smaller reduction inFIGURE 3 IMPACT OF LAGGED OIL PRICE
INCREASES ON REAL GNP GROWTH, 1955-89
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output—0.3 percent annually over a
three-year interval. For the 1982-89
period, the effect of oil price changes on
the economy was minimal: Over the
three years following a 10 percent oil
price increase, real GNP tended to fall
by only about 0.2 percent per year. More-
over, the estimates from the 1982-89
period were not statistically significant.
• The Supply of Oil and
the Supply of Money
Can monetary policymakers do anything
to offset the negative effects of an oil
shock? Clearly, higher oil prices reduce
output and exert upward pressure on the
price level. It would seem, then, that
supply shocks present a dilemma; if the
Federal Reserve is inclined to repress the
rise in prices, it should seek to reduce
bank reserves, but if it intends to support
output, then it may be tempted to ease.
First, consider the correspondence
between relative oil price increases
and the inflation rate in the United
States (figure 4A). Historically, as oil
prices have soared, so too have non-oil,
non-food consumer prices. By what
process do higher oil prices produce a
rise in the general price level? Virtually
all goods (and services) can, to varying
degrees, be linked to oil, and the ability
of firms to pass these higher costs on
to consumers depends on the degree to
which consumers can find substitutes.
Yet higher oil prices cannot be auto-
matically transmitted across all goods
and services—there simply is not a
sufficient stock of money in circulation
to allow for a general rise in the price
level. Without monetary accommodation,
the prices of some goods will rise only
if the prices of other goods fall.
However, the decline in national output
caused by an oil shortage creates a sur-
plus of money relative to output. These
excess money balances push up the prices
of all goods and services; hence, it is
the surplus of money that ultimately
allows the oil price increase to be trans-
mitted as a general inflation. Figure 4B
shows that soaring oil prices correspond
with a surge in base money relative to
national output.
It would be consoling to know that the
Federal Reserve could forestall the slow-
down in business activity that stems
from an oil shock. So many uncomfort-
able adjustments to higher oil prices
could then be avoided. But unfortunately,
the decline in real output reflects the
fact that an important raw material is
now scarcer. No increase or decrease in
money supply or interest rates will make
foreign oil more readily available to the
United States.
Still, monetary policy might attempt to
offset certain secondary effects of an oil
price shock. Major economic adjust-
ments are rarely smooth; a temporary lull
in aggregate demand and a rise in invol-
untary unemployment may occur as a
nation adjusts to higher energy prices.
Involuntary unemployment arises as a
result of various impediments to the mar-
ket adjustment process, such as institu-
tional or governmental restrictions and
imperfect information. At the heart of
these impediments are erroneous expec-
tations—that is, contracts and other tem-
porarily fixed agreements that were
negotiated prior to the oil shock. For
example, the oil shock may cause a drop
in labor productivity, producing down-
ward pressure on real wages that exceeds
the real wage decline that would result
from rising prices alone. Employees may
resist wage adjustments if they have pre-
viously established labor agreements. If
they do resist, unemployment will rise,
since firms will now find real wage
levels incompatible with the deteriorat-
ing business climate. The rise in involun-
tary unemployment also implies that out-
put will fall by more than what the
supply shock alone would indicate.
We can further presume that the change
in oil prices redistributes income from
energy users to energy producers. This
prompts offsetting spending decreases
by consumers and spending increases
by producers. However, there is no guar-




may play out over a period of time, and
as they do, aggregate demand could be
temporarily reduced and real wages may
need to temporarily fall.13
If a monetary policy easing could lower
real interest rates and encourage a rise in
spending, the Federal Reserve might try
to offset temporary reductions in aggre-FIGURE 4A INFLATION AND RELATIVE OIL PRICES









a. Oil prices divided by Consumer Price Index less food and energy.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
FIGURE 4B INFLATION AND THE MONETARY
BASE/REAL GNP RATIO
gate demand that stem from the supply
shock, then institute a period of tighten-
ing in order to avoid an environment of
"excess spending" as markets adjust.
Using monetary policy to "fine tune"
aggregate demand is, of course, a con-
troversial matter among economists.
First, the Federal Reserve's ability to
determine real interest rates is open to
question. Moreover, if a channel from
monetary policy to aggregate demand
does exist, both the strength and the
timing of this linkage are unclear. Fur-
thermore, data may be neither timely
nor accurate enough to reveal the
development of a shortfall in aggregate
demand. It is possible that a monetary
policy aimed at stabilizing aggregate
demand may actually destabilize the
economy as the uncertainties caused by
the supply shock are compounded by
fluctuations in money, inflation expecta-
tions, and interest rates. Efforts to fine tune
the economy may, in the end, simply
impede the adjustment to a new set of
relative prices and resource usage pat-
terns, both of which are necessary
responses to higher-priced oil.
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• Conclusion
Theory offers some insight into how
the supply shock associated with Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait will impact the
U.S. economy. Unfortunately, mone-
tary policy cannot change the reality
that oil prices are now higher and there-
fore output will be lower than it would
otherwise have been. However, it is
necessary to weigh any benefit of using
monetary policy to smooth the adjust-
ment process against the risk of enabling
the oil price increase to be transmitted
as an increase in the inflation rate.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.• Footnotes
1. James D. Hamilton is a leading propo-
nent of this view. See James D. Hamilton,
"Oil and the Macroeconomy since World
War II," Journal of Political Economy, vol.
91, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 228-48.
2. Supply shocks can also have a positive
impact on the economy. Two examples are
the discovery of a natural resource (Alaskan
oil reserves) and a technical innovation (com-
puters).
3. This discussion assumes efficient, ration-
al, and instantaneous market adjustments to
the shock. For a textbook discussion of supply
shocks and macroeconomic activity from this
neoclassical perspective, see Robert J. Barro,
Macroeconomics, 2d ed. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1987.
4. Work effort is defined as total hours
worked in the economy, and reflects the level
of employment and the average number of
hours worked per person.
5. These expectations seem to have been
largely borne out. Real oil prices remained
above their pre-1974 level for a period of 12
years following the 1974 shock. In contrast,
the real oil price increases of 1979 and 1980-
81 held for relatively brief periods.
6. As compared with the July 10, 1990 (pre-
invasion) forecast.
7. This seems to be contrary to the oil
price expectations implied in futures
markets, which indicate that crude oil prices
are expected to fall back to near their pre-
invasion level over the next 12 months.
8. These estimates were made using an
Almon-type distributed lag regression. Our
results were quite similar to the response func-
tions reported by Hamilton (see footnote 1).
9. Because the impact of oil on the economy
may not be symmetric, the 1982-89 period
could have been influenced by the large
decline in energy prices that occurred during
these years. For a detailed explanation of this
possibility, see Knut Anton Mork,"Oil and
the Macroeconomy When Prices Go Up and
Down: An Extension of Hamilton's Results,"
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97, no. 3
(June 1989), pp. 740-44.
10. Money is measured by the monetary
base—currency held by the public plus bank
deposits at the Federal Reserve.
11. There is ample evidence that the rate of
unemployment rises following energy shocks.
For example, Hamilton identifies a strong
linkage between oil price shocks and the rate
of unemployment (see footnote 1), while
Loungani shows that structural shifts pre-
viously claimed to impact unemployment
rates may actually have been responses to
changing oil prices. In both instances, how-
ever, the increase in unemployment caused by
a reallocation of resources may be the result
of a rise in the full-employment rate of unem-
ployment, or natural unemployment. This is
distinctly different from the involuntary unem-
ployment caused by nominal wage rigidity.
See Prakash Loungani, "Oil Price Shocks and
the Dispersion Hypothesis," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, vol. 68, no. 3 (August
1986), pp. 536-39.
12. For example, domestic energy producers'
propensity to consume and invest may be
less than that of domestic users. In the case
of foreign energy producers, it may be that
export demands increase less rapidly than
domestic consumer spending declines.
13. The Council of Economic Advisors esti-
mated that the 1979 oil price shock reduced
aggregate demand by $53 billion that year.
(See Economic Report of the President.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, January 1980, p. 65.) To the extent
that the income redistribution is believed to be
temporary, the aggregate demand/unemploy-
ment rate effects will be smaller.
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